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THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN MICROTARGETING: AN 
EXAMINATION OF MODERN POLITICAL MESSAGING 
LUKE BUNTING, BUTLER UNIVERSITY 
MENTOR: MARGARET BRABANT 
Abstract 
The usage of targeted messaging by political campaigns has seen a drastic 
evolution in the past fifty years. Through advancement in campaign technol-
ogy and an increasingly large amount of personal information for sale to or-
ganizations willing to pay for it, campaigns have continually narrowed their 
scope from targeting large demographic groups to targeting voters individual-
ly through a process called microtargeting. This paper examines the history 
of microtargeting in American presidential campaigns, which has resulted in 
a smaller, more polarized electorate. 
1960 to 2000: A Narrowing of Focus 
The usage of targeted messaging by political campaigns has seen a drastic 
evolution in the past fifty years. Through advancement in campaign technol-
ogy and an increasingly large amount of personal information for sale to or-
ganizations willing to pay for it, campaigns have continually narrowed their 
scope from targeting large demographic groups to targeting voters individual-
ly through a process called microtargeting. Microtargeting, defined by jour-
nalist Steven Levy, is “a way to identify small but crucial groups of voters 
who might be won over to a given side, and which messages would do the 
trick” (Levy 2013). Microtargeting as we know it today finds its roots decades 
before the modern iteration in the Republicans’ Southern Strategy of the 
1960s.  
 During the 1960s, Republicans faced a new political reality: demograph-
ic shifts made winning in the South necessary to capture the presidency. The 
1960 election saw presidential candidate Richard Nixon state that he be-
lieved in the Civil Rights Movement, a stance which put him at odds with 
many Southern voters. When Nixon ran again in 1968 after his unsuccessful 
try in 1960, his team looked at changing the candidate’s positions on certain 
issues to sway voters in crucial states. This decision to tailor messaging in 
order to specifically win white, Southern voters was referred to as the 
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“Southern Strategy.” These white voters made up a large majority of the 
states’ electorate due to lingering voting restrictions which prevented 
African-Americans from casting a ballot, even in counties where they formed 
a majority of the population. Southern white voters considered civil rights 
legislation the most important issue of the campaign and in the 1968 election, 
candidate Nixon suggested that some civil rights legislation was going too far 
and perhaps should be repealed. This new framing of the issue won over per-
suadable voters in the South, as civil rights proved to be an issue which could 
be used to cause a voter to cast a ballot against their affiliated party. These 
issues are commonly referred to as wedge issues, as they are used to drive a 
wedge between a voter and his or her party (Hillygus et al. 2008).  
 The Southern Strategy demonstrated one of the earliest large-scale ef-
forts to target voters based upon personal data. In Nixon’s case, this target-
ing was very broad, simply categorizing voters as Northern or Southern. The 
assumption was that all Southern states would be winnable if civil rights is-
sues were stressed, due to the states’ restrictions on African-American voting 
and the states’ general attitudes toward these issues. The effectiveness of this 
approach pointed to the potential for grouping voters based upon demograph-
ics such as location and race. 
 Nixon’s successor, President Gerald Ford, realized the potential in nar-
rowing campaign targeting. Ford faced a difficult reelection bid in 1976, in 
part due to his pardoning of President Nixon. The Ford campaign decided to 
take the targeting of voters slightly further, using polling data to determine 
which issues would resonate with voters in more specific demographic sub-
sets than just their state of residence. A memo from Ford campaign officials 
discussed the necessity of appealing to female suburban voters, to whom en-
vironmental issues were proving to be of the utmost importance (Hillygus et 
al. 2008). The memo suggests that President Ford begin to speak favorably 
about environmental legislation and should make moves which would ap-
pease this group, but also warns that the president must not alienate work-
ing-class Republican voters who may see the legislation as threatening manu-
facturing jobs. This same memo also shed some light upon the shift away 
from campaigning on racial issues, as polls demonstrated that voters did not 
list it among their top concerns. Thus, focusing campaign time and resources 
on racial issues would not prove effective in swaying many persuadable vot-
ers (Hillygus et al. 2008). 
 This targeting of general demographics continued through both the 
1980s and the early 1990s, with little in the way of evolution. President Clin-
ton began to lay the groundwork of modern microtargeting during his reelec-
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tion campaign in 1996 when the campaign divided potential voters based on 
demographic data and sought to target messages specifically for each group. 
The campaign further divided voters into nine categories based on their likely 
political affiliation, with each grouping having charts demonstrating which 
issues would resonate with them (Sosnik, et al 2006).   
 However, Clinton’s 1996 campaign became known for more than just a 
new way of looking at demographic data. It was also the first presidential 
campaign with well-documented usage of consumer data to help build voter 
profiles. Until the 1996 presidential election cycle, messaging had targeted 
voters based upon commonalities in their general demographic information, 
e.g. marital status, ethnicity, and location. The idea was that even if some 
individuals in these broad groups would not respond to certain messages, a 
majority of those in the given group would. This kind of messaging was based 
upon the general voting patterns of the demographics of each grouping. Hop-
ing to utilize information more specific to each voter, the Clinton campaign 
hired the firm Claritas, which specialized in collecting consumer data for cor-
porate advertising. Firms such as Claritas would utilize a variety of methods 
to obtain this information, such as purchasing lists of subscribers to maga-
zines and conducting polls (Sosnik, et al 2006). 
 The data collected by this firm has been referred to as “lifestyle” data: 
combining an overview of individuals’ purchasing habits and affiliations in 
order to create a voter profile for each person. Clinton’s team merged this 
lifestyle data with their political data to create a more complete file on each 
likely voter. Joining with Claritas allowed the campaign to capitalize on de-
mographic facts such as Democrats being heavier TV-watchers and late-night 
television shows drawing a younger viewing audience. Using this data, the 
campaign recognized that an appearance on late-night television would help 
Clinton shore up support among younger liberal voters, spurring the cam-
paign to arrange for Clinton to make several appearances on these programs 
(Sosnik, et al 2006). 
 While lifestyle data had never been used before to this magnitude in a 
presidential campaign, the political establishment had known for years that 
there existed links between certain behaviors and voting preference. Accord-
ing to Eddie Mahe, a Republican consultant, the Republican National Com-
mittee began to run inquiries into voting behavior and consumer habits dur-
ing the 1970s. One of the revelations from this research was the finding that 
people who purchased Mercury automobiles were more likely to vote Republi-
can than those who purchased any other kind of automobile (Gertner 2004). 
However, parties were unable to utilize this data in a way which would help 
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them win votes. While Clinton’s 1996 campaign began to utilize this data to 
win over certain groups, the technology did not yet exist to fully capitalize on 
its potential. 
 While the following presidential election in 2000 did not see advance-
ments in the use of lifestyle data, it did mark the beginning of a new trend in 
campaign targeting. While campaigns in the past had focused heavily on 
winning over independents already likely to vote for their candidate, this 
election saw a shift in that strategy. After eight years of the Clinton presi-
dency, the electorate’s top four concerns going into the 2000 presidential elec-
tion gave the Democrat candidate an advantage in three of them. The issues 
of education, prescription drug costs, and Social Security reform were three of 
the four most cited issues, and all three had Gore holding a lead over Bush in 
the public’s confidence. This meant that a campaign on just the issues seen as 
most important by the electorate would give Gore an advantage over Bush. 
Only the issue of tax cuts saw George W. Bush holding an advantage over 
Gore in the polling (Ceaser, Busch 2001).   
 The Bush campaign recognized that they would not be able to win run-
ning on the issues where Republicans held a lead over Democrats. Issues 
where public polling indicated a Republican advantage were, for the most 
part, not being cited as important issues during the 2000 election, making 
campaigning on them inevitably ineffective. Instead, the Bush campaign for-
mulated a plan to make inroads on the issues where Gore drew the most 
strength. Labeling his ideology as “compassionate conservatism,” Bush 
sought to win over likely Gore voters with his stance on one of the three is-
sues, utilizing the lifestyle data of each voter to decide which of the issues 
would be most effective (Ceaser, Busch 2001). Gore, on the other hand, had to 
combat two major hurdles: 57% of Americans claiming that the country was 
on the wrong moral track and 60% of Americans having an unfavorable view 
of President Bill Clinton (Ceaser, Busch 2001). To combat these problems, 
Gore broke with Clinton’s tone on the campaign trail, opting for a more pop-
ulist message that contrasted with Clinton’s “Third Way” liberalism. The se-
lection of Joe Lieberman as Gore’s pick for Vice-President continued Gore’s 
movement away from the sitting President, as Lieberman was a moderate 
with a history of criticizing Clinton. Lastly, Gore made sure that cameras 
would catch him kissing his wife, a tactic to quell voters’ fears about more 
infidelity in the White House. The uphill battles faced by both campaigns re-
sulted in the closest election of the modern age, with Vice President Gore 
winning the popular vote but losing the electoral vote to Bush based upon a 
2000 Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore (Ceaser, Busch 2001) 
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2004: The Synthesis of Data and Technology 
The presidential election in 2004 is notable for the creation of modern-day 
microtargeting, capitalizing on innovations in messaging technology. Both 
the Republican George W. Bush and Democrat John Kerry campaigns sought 
to amass a large number of demographic indicators for each voter, allowing 
them to target messages for incredibly specific subsets of voters based upon 
their gender, income, religious affiliation, and the lifestyle data provided by 
consumer research firms. Much of this information was a result of the 1993 
National Voter Registration Act, which allowed citizens to register to vote 
when applying for a driver’s license. Access to registration information be-
came even easier with the 2002 Help America Vote Act. This act was particu-
larly helpful as it mandated the creation of a single national registry of all 
registered voters (Hillygus et al. 2008). Having voter registration tied to dri-
ver’s license registration meant that all of the information required for the 
license was also present on the voter registration file. This made a large 
amount of personal demographic data available to political groups when they 
purchased the voter registration files. Mirroring this increase in voter infor-
mation was the amount of individual consumer information which was made 
available to organizations. Data-gathering companies had become much more 
commonplace for the express purpose of collecting and selling individuals’ 
consumer habits to campaigns. Lifestyle data was then used to supplement 
information gained through the voter registration records (Sosnik, et al 
2006).   
 By combining all of this available information, both the Republican and 
Democratic parties managed to compile a comprehensive database containing 
information on every American voter by 2004. Voter Vault became the name 
for the Republicans’, while Datamart was the Democrats’ (Gertner 2004). 
Profiles for the voters within the Datamart and Voter Vault systems could 
contain hundreds of data points for a single person based off the information 
collected. The hope was that by collecting information on voters as individu-
als, campaigns would be able to identify individuals whose voting patterns 
differed from the general pattern of a demographic of which they were a part. 
An example of this would be a potential Democratic voter living in a Republi-
can household. Under previous methods, such a voter would have been la-
beled a likely-Republican and targeted as such. Once campaigns utilized mi-
crotargeting, having information on such a voter as an individual allowed 
them to recognize his or her actual political leaning. In order to ensure suc-
cess during the final months of the race, the Bush campaign sought out the 
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membership lists of churches and other organizations during the first months 
of 2004. Additionally, volunteers were recruited to canvass and interview 
voters with the goal of adding this newly-acquired information into the data-
bases (Gertner 2004). 
  While a large amount of data is beneficial in determining which voters 
to target with which messages, new forms of political outreach have allowed 
campaigns to better persuade voters. Recent studies have documented the 
continuing decline in television ads’ effectiveness for election campaigns. 
Considering the immense cost associated with these ads, many campaigns 
have shifted focus to direct mail, canvassing, phone banks, social media, and 
text messaging methods. Studies conducted on these new techniques have 
demonstrated the effectiveness of both phone and face-to-face contact with 
campaigns, suggesting that utilizing both can lead to a bump from 1 to 4 
points in the final popular vote. It has also been found that face-to-face can-
vassing produces a stronger positive reaction than phone contact, but the lat-
ter’s effectiveness is still present (John, Brannan 2008). 
 Coming out of the 2000 national elections, the Republican Party recog-
nized that superior grassroots organizing that took advantage of emerging 
targeting techniques had allowed the Democrats to outperform their expected 
turnout. Gearing up for the 2004 race, the Republicans aimed to expand their 
own data collection and voter contact. Looking over voting patterns from the 
previous election cycles, Bush strategists realized that the number of people 
with independent voting records had shrunk from 16% in 1988 to 7% in 2002. 
Voter targeting would have to shift focus to create new Republican voters in 
states where the contest was bound to be close. Karl Rove, a Senior Advisor 
for the Bush administration, crafted a plan for the campaign to find these 
new voters in districts where demographic data suggested a large Republican 
advantage. Once districts falling into this category were identified, the cam-
paign would look for those which had seen Republican candidates underper-
form compared to demographic predictions. Those districts would be heavily 
targeted, as the information suggested that while people in the district would 
favor Republican candidates, there was a lack of political interest (Ceaser, 
Busch 2001).  
 The Bush campaign began to analyze its data on voters and divided the 
entire population into segments based on demographic data. Within each of 
these segments, individuals were then ranked based on the likelihood that 
they would vote and whether they would vote specifically for President Bush. 
This allowed for the campaign’s messaging to be sent only to those who need-
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ed persuading, saving the campaign from wasting resources on voters already 
likely to vote for Bush and those unlikely to do so (Ceaser, Busch 2001). 
 To create a database of voters, the Bush campaign used the Republican 
National Committee’s (RNC) donor and volunteer lists as a starting point. 
They hired the marketing research firm Axciom, which had lifestyle informa-
tion on 95% of those in the RNC’s database, giving the Bush campaign infor-
mation on approximately 5.7 to 6 million voters. Using this data, the cam-
paign was able to call roughly 5,000 voters with a survey and ask questions 
designed to find out which issues had the most traction with voters. Between 
the data provided by Axciom and the survey, the campaign claimed the abili-
ty to predict voter behavior with 80-90% accuracy (Sosnik, et al 2006).  
 It is worth noting that the 2004 election cycle saw a vast majority of the 
campaigns’ efforts focused on states generally perceived as “swing states,” 
having awarded their electoral votes to each of the parties at some point in 
the recent past. It is estimated that both the Bush and Kerry campaigns 
spent an average of 8.7 million dollars on these 16 states alone, and did not 
want to invest too heavily in states unlikely to change their voting prefer-
ence, which were seen as “non-competitive.” This disparity between swing 
states and non-competitive ones can also be seen in the amount of direct mail 
received by residents. On average, those living in swing states received over 
twice as many pieces of direct mail from campaigns as those living in non-
competitive ones. Both campaigns neglected targeting voters with inconsis-
tent voting activity, targeting active voters more than seven times as much as 
inactive. Similarly, voters in swing states received almost 11 times as many 
door-to-door visits from a campaign as did those living in non-competitive 
states (Sosnik, et al 2006). 
 It is important to note that the 2004 campaigns targeting efforts rarely 
overlapped, even when the campaigns were discussing the same issue. Data 
shows that while both the Kerry and Bush campaign sent out mailings con-
cerning taxes, only 31% of those receiving mail on tax issues received mail 
from both candidates. Of all the issues discussed, this percentage of overlap is 
the highest, demonstrating that targeting on the same issue yielded vastly 
different sets of voters for each campaign. This difference was a result of the 
campaigns’ ability to recognize the voters most likely to vote for their candi-
date, and aiming to target only them. Furthermore, the Bush campaign 
sought out people coded as “navigators,” who were most likely to discuss 
Bush with family and friends. These people were considered to have the 
greatest chance of winning votes for the President, and they were specially 
targeted with emails and mailers encouraging them to discuss President 
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Bush with others. Studies have also found that these people, considered in-
fluential in their communities, are more likely to have others ask them for 
political advice than any other kind of advice. The Bush campaign is said to 
have had a list of 7 million volunteers and 2 million navigators contacted by 
the campaign (Sosnik, et al 2006).  
 Additionally, studies show that each campaign had a certain set of is-
sues that it was most likely to advertise. For example, Kerry’s campaign was 
almost four times as likely to campaign on health care issues as Bush’s, while 
the Bush campaign was nine times more likely to address gay issues in its 
advertisements. Bush’s opposition to gay marriage was generally referred to 
within the context of “family” or “traditional” values. Additionally, Bush was 
advised to frame his decision to invade Iraq as part of a larger “War on Ter-
ror,” as voters were mostly against the war. This framing connected the war 
to values to which voters responded (Hillygus et al. 2008). 
 Studies have also found that contrary to conventional wisdom, both the 
Kerry and Bush campaigns focused a majority of their targeted messaging on 
wedge-issue voters rather than shoring up support within their base. These 
voters are affiliated with a certain political party, but have demographic data 
suggesting that they disagree with that party on at least one major issue. In 
a majority of cases in 2004, messages were actually targeted to appeal to vot-
ers of the opposite party whose affiliation was not seen as especially strong. 
Thus, the campaigns sought to use crucial issues as a way to break off parts 
of the opposition’s base voting block (Hillygus et al. 2008). According to the 
data, Bush’s campaign was much more effective at this than Kerry’s, as 11% 
of Democrats voted for Bush, while only 6% of Republicans voted for Kerry. 
Bush’s defection rate in this election marks one of the lowest in the age of 
modern polling (Ceaser, Busch 136).  
 At the same time, both campaigns avoided touching on issues where the 
public disagreed with their candidate. This was especially evident at the De-
mocratic Convention during the 2004 cycle, where issues of gun control and 
abortion were downplayed or not mentioned by major speakers. These were 
issues where Bush’s stance was favored by the public, causing Kerry to avoid 
campaigning heavily upon them in order to win over swing voters (Ceaser, 
Busch 117).  
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2008-Present: Social Networks and Advancing Technology 
The 2008 presidential election is notable for the significant campaigning that 
took place during the Democratic primaries. The two candidates consistently 
winning these contests were Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. 
For Senator Obama, the eventual victor of the primary and general elections 
that year, the biggest challenge was proving that he had the experience for 
the job of President. Luckily for the Obama campaign, the organization’s 
polling showed that President Bush’s unpopularity caused a large amount of 
voters to want a candidate promising change from the status quo. Due to this 
unpopularity caused by a poor economy and dissatisfaction with the war in 
Iraq, Obama’s team decided that the best way to sell the candidate was to 
portray him as “not Bush” (Lizza 2008). During the primary season, this ne-
cessitated connecting Senator Clinton to President Bush as often as possible. 
Adopting a slogan of “Change we can believe in,” Obama’s team painted him 
as a Washington outsider running against a career politician who had voted 
in favor of an unpopular war in Iraq. This framing of his perceived lack of ex-
perience allowed the campaign to turn his greatest weakness into a strength 
(Lizza 2008). 
 Continuing into the general election, the Obama campaign once again 
cast its opponent as a Washington insider with ties to President Bush. The 
campaign’s initial concern about facing Senator John McCain in the general 
election was based on his record in the Senate and a fear that voters would 
identify him as a true moderate willing to buck the system. However, the 
campaign’s top pollster demonstrated that the electorate defined McCain by 
his statements during the Republican primaries, not by his history in the 
Senate. This gave the Obama campaign the opportunity to define McCain as 
they wished, opting once again to draw parallels between the opposition and 
President George W. Bush (Lizza 2008). The Obama campaign tapped Sena-
tor Joe Biden as Obama’s running mate, hoping that this choice would ad-
dress fears about Obama’s inexperience and compensate for his lack of for-
eign policy experience compared to McCain (Heilemann, Halperin 2010). 
 Discontent with outgoing President George W. Bush’s handling of the 
economy and Iraq War meant that many states long seen as heavily Republi-
can could possibly be in play during the 2008 presidential election. Ignoring 
the commonly-held political wisdom that Southern states were guaranteed 
Republican states, the Obama campaign expanded its operations into Vir-
ginia, North Carolina and Georgia. In order to win over previously Republi-
can voters, the Obama campaign recognized the need for supportive voters to 
 9
BUTLER JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, VOLUME 1
attest to the character of Senator Obama. To do this, they employed a strate-
gy similar to the “navigators” employed by the Bush campaigns, locating 
Obama supporters in the South who could convince voters hesitant to cast a 
ballot for a Northern liberal politician. One field organizer in the region re-
ferred to these influential supporters as “character witnesses” (Fineman 
2008). In the end, the campaign’s overall strategy appears to have been most-
ly successful, with both North Carolina and Virginia going for Barack Oba-
ma. This was the first time the latter had voted for a Democrat since 1964. 
 The Obama campaign’s expansion into these states was seen by many 
analysts as a redrawing of the accepted political map, with some assuming 
they would become swing states in future elections. Obama’s 2008 election 
did bring with it some good demographic news for the Democrats. During 
that election, Senator Obama won 66% of the votes cast by young adults, 
while African-Americans and those of Hispanic background voted in larger 
numbers than ever before. These three groups are statistically more likely to 
vote Democratic, and their increased presence in the 2008 race was a signifi-
cant factor in Obama’s victory, and attributed to their identifying with the 
candidate due his ethnic background (Kiss 2008). Since this increase in mi-
nority turnout, voter identification legislation at the state level has come un-
der scrutiny. Voter identification laws require that citizens present a state-
issued identification card before being able to cast their ballots. Groups such 
as the American Civil Liberties Union allege that these laws are meant to 
discourage minority voting, as minorities would have less access to these 
forms of identification (Prince 2014). They claim that Republican lawmakers 
are using these laws to keep a large portion of the Democrats’ likely support-
ers from being able to vote. Despite these concerns, new voting laws drawing 
complaints from outside groups continue to spread throughout states such as 
Indiana and Ohio (American Civil Liberties Union 2014).   
 In addition to minority voters, young voters also received a great deal of 
attention in 2008. Young voters were seen by the Obama camp as being high-
ly targetable, and a strategy was crafted to ensure strong support from this 
demographic. One part of this strategy was compiling a list of over three mil-
lion cell phone numbers which were provided to the campaign consensually 
by the owner. The campaign promised those who signed up that they would 
receive campaign news via text message before the news was provided to the 
media (Kiss 2008).  
 Additionally, online campaign presence saw a dramatic increase during 
the 2008 election. A Pew Research Center study from that year found that 
46% of Americans used e-mail, Internet, or text messages to gain knowledge 
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of the presidential campaigns, discuss the election, or mobilize others to vol-
unteer (Dutta et al. 2008). The Obama campaign appeared much more pre-
pared to take advantage of this increase in Internet usage for political activi-
ty, focusing on their presence on social networking sites such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube. During the primary, the campaign’s efforts led to a 
lead in Facebook followers of 250,000 to Clinton’s 3,200. In the general elec-
tion, Obama’s number of followers on the site rose to over 2 million, while the 
number of Twitter followers reached 112,000. McCain’s Facebook profile saw 
over 600,000 followers, with only 4,600 on Twitter. Obama’s YouTube profile 
uploaded almost six times as many videos as McCain’s, and had almost four 
times as many subscribers (Dutta et al. 2008).  
 This use of online social networking sites allowed supporters to easily 
share campaign information and advertisements with their friends. The 
Obama application for smartphones even allowed for the user to send out 
messages supporting Obama to all of his or her contacts. For a candidate who 
initially struggled with voters being unaware of his history, social networking 
provided an easy and accessible platform to inform the public of Obama’s past 
and credentials. While the Internet had been used in political campaigns be-
fore, the 2008 election marked the first time its primary use had been for 
aims other than fundraising (Dutta et al. 2008). 
 Understanding the importance of voter turnout on Election Day, the 
Obama campaign organized a state-of-the-art get-out-the-vote apparatus re-
ferred to as “Project Houdini.” Under this program, volunteers would be sta-
tioned at polling locations to check off targeted voters on a roster when they 
came to the polls. Each of the voters on the roster for that precinct would be 
assigned a four-digit code, which the volunteer would input into the cam-
paign’s system via a hotline called throughout the day. The goal of this pro-
gram was to give the campaign updates of who had voted in almost real-time, 
keeping them from wasting resources calling or contacting those who had al-
ready voted. In practice, however, the influx of calls from volunteers was 
enough to shut down the hotline. The failure of the automated system forced 
volunteers to report the voter codes to local campaign offices, where the codes 
were then entered into the system manually by another volunteer (Herbert 
2008).  Since this program was only used for precincts labeled high-priority, 
the failure of the system did not completely derail the campaign’s efforts at 
voter turnout (Jacobs 2012). Despite the crashing of the hotline, the Obama 
campaign’s contacting was still more pervasive than McCain, with 28% of 
voters claiming to have been contacted by the Obama campaign, while only 
22% said the same of the McCain campaign (Herbert 2008).  
 11
BUTLER JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, VOLUME 1
 For the 2012 presidential election, the campaign of Republican candi-
date Mitt Romney recognized the need to compete with President Obama in 
both online targeting of voters and get-out-the-vote operations on Election 
Day. From 2008 to 2012, Americans continued to watch less live television, 
choosing instead to watch programming in a variety ways, i.e. DVR. Some 
estimates predicted that up to one-third of voters in 2012 did not see political 
advertisements aired on television, with digital consumption of programming 
beginning to act as a full substitute to live television rather than a supple-
ment (Peters 2012).  
 During the month of April 2012, the Romney campaign created two dif-
ferent commercials which they had been airing on television in Wisconsin for 
the primaries. One of the ads discussed Romney’s business background and 
experience, making it a more positive political ad. The second one was a neg-
ative ad criticizing Senator Rick Santorum, an opponent in the Republican 
primaries. Knowing that this ad would not be seen by almost a third of the 
electorate, the Romney campaign began running polls in order to determine 
which groups of voters were least likely to be watching live television. These 
groups were then selected for online advertisements. Additional research 
with the digital strategy firm Targeted Victory determined that the most per-
suadable group which was also the least likely to watch television was voters 
over the age of 18 who were dissatisfied with the Obama administration and 
tended to lean Republican (Peters 2012).  
 Adding to the complicated nature of online political advertising was the 
fact that characteristics of likely Romney supporters varied by state as well. 
In Michigan, for example, online users who frequented music sites to listen to 
Christian music were much less likely to support Romney during the prima-
ry. The campaign assumed that these voters most likely supported Senator 
Rick Santorum during the primary contests. This meant that advertising on 
those sites did not feature Romney’s ad criticizing Santorum, as that message 
was likely to be poorly received. Instead, these users would see the ad dis-
cussing Romney’s business experience (Peters 2012). This strategy for picking 
messaging based on an Internet user’s lifestyle data would continue into the 
general election. 
 With the McCain campaign focusing little on online interaction during 
the 2008 contest, the Romney campaign had little information regarding 
what online behaviors would reflect a stronger likelihood of leaning Republi-
can. Thus, its online advertisements were created to collect data on those in-
dividuals who interacted with it. The advertisements contained a video which 
would start playing after the user hovered the cursor over the advertisement 
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for three seconds. Using this technology, the campaign gathered information 
on not only who was initiating the playing of the video, but also how long he 
or she watched and whether the user clicked for further information. After 
cross-referencing this interaction with the personal data collected on the vot-
ers, the campaign determined several characteristics which made an online 
user more likely to vote Republican. According to this information, these vot-
ers like to take online quizzes concerning news and entertainment, share 
photographs, and are interested in technology, home repair, child care, and 
literature (Peters 2012). Voters less likely to vote Republican were those in-
terested in video and casino games, martial arts, jazz, and bowling (Peters 
2012).  
 The e-mails sent by the Obama campaign during the 2012 election were 
also able to track similar data as the Romney campaign’s advertisements. 
The Obama campaign was able to see who had opened a particular campaign 
e-mail and when. They were also able to track which links within the body of 
an e-mail were clicked by a given recipient. The campaign would use this 
data to judge a voter’s interest in learning more about President Obama and 
his platform. It would then send fewer e-mails to those consistently not en-
gaging with the correspondence (Peters 2012).  
 When it came to microtargeting voters, the Obama campaign in 2012 
sought to fix some of the problems which had plagued the 2008 campaign’s 
efforts to microtarget online. During that previous election, Obama’s online 
messaging was not refined for each voter based on data collected about him 
or her, while direct mailings were. This was due to the campaign’s inability to 
combine the e-mail addresses provided to the campaign with the existing vot-
er profiles used for microtargeting. Thus, e-mails from that campaign had 
stuck with general messaging on popular issues (Peters 2012).  
 For the 2012 campaign, the Obama campaign launched Project Nar-
whal, a sophisticated system designed to link a voter’s online habits and con-
tact information with the rest of the microtargeting data compiled on him or 
her. The campaign would then be able to personalize messaging to each voter 
through not only direct mailing, but also through e-mails dealing with specif-
ic issues. The accumulation of this massive amount of data in one single sys-
tem allowed for easy use in every part of the campaign, whereas previous 
campaigns had stored it across multiple servers necessitating physically 
transferring data from one to another (Issenberg 2012).  
 While the Romney campaign certainly targeted voters based on their 
voter profiles, as demonstrated by the use of specific ads in the Wisconsin 
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primary, it labeled its Election Day turnout project as its secret weapon, and 
as its answer to the Obama campaign’s Project Narwhal. In fact, the name 
ORCA was chosen due to the Orca being the primary predator of the Narwhal 
(Jacobs 2012). Despite Project ORCA being billed as the Romney campaign’s 
response to Project Narwhal, its aim was much more in line with what Oba-
ma had tried in 2008 with Project Houdini. The program would allow for poll-
watchers to log in real-time which voters had already cast their ballots via an 
application or website for phones. This focus primarily on Election Day 
turnout left Romney incredibly vulnerable to technological glitches derailing 
the largest part of his strategy. When Election Day came, the system crashed, 
causing the campaign to fly blind throughout the entirety of the voting 
process. Ironically, this was the same issue which derailed the Obama cam-
paign’s Project Houdini. Obama campaign officials stated that the failures of 
Houdini in 2008 had demonstrated that the technology was not yet ready for 
use on such a large scale, which ORCA’s failure only further proved (Jacobs 
2012).  
 The failure of ORCA meant that the Romney Campaign had almost no 
idea which voters had cast a ballot, and which likely Romney supporters still 
needed to be contacted in order to ensure voting. The 2012 Obama campaign 
developed a new project to log voter contact on Election Day. Project Gordon, 
named after the man credited with killing Houdini, used smartphone report-
ing instead of phone calls to allow for faster reporting of data. The 2012 cam-
paign, however, did not make a centerpiece of their strategy as they had in 
2008, as they were wary of the possibility of crashes, such as the ones experi-
enced by Project Houdini and Project ORCA. There have been no reports of 
Project Gordon crashing on Election Day 2012, but its limited use and scope 
during that campaign makes it difficult to judge its effectiveness (Jacobs 
2012).  
 Following the surge in popularity of social networking sites, the 2008 
and 2012 campaigns began to use these mediums to more easily target voters 
based upon their web usage information. Starting with the 2008 election, 
Facebook, the world’s most popular social networking site, began to allow po-
litical firms access to users’ profile data to help facilitate targeted advertise-
ments. The Obama campaign, in particular, made effective use of this, hoping 
to engage young voters (Dutta, Fraser 2008). In the 2012 Republican prima-
ry, Representative Michelle Bachmann’s campaign used this Facebook infor-
mation to advertise to those who “liked” Christian rock artists on the site, 
claimed to like the Tea Party, or who had posted a status about favoring tax 
cuts. The hope was that Facebook users falling into these categories would be 
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more receptive to Representative Bachmann’s conservative stances (Dwoskin 
2014).  
 Twitter, another popular social networking site, has also seen a large 
amount of political use since 2008. During the 2012 presidential campaign, 
Twitter saw 10 million tweets during the first presidential debate and 20 mil-
lion on Election Day (Zhang, Seltzer, Bichard 2013). These numbers suggest 
that voters are increasingly turning to the Internet to voice their political af-
filiations and interactions, making it a prime medium for political campaigns. 
Due to the relatively new nature of this political adoption of social network-
ing sites, political scientists are still unsure of the actual effects they have on 
voters. One of the leading criticisms of political activity on social networking 
sites is that the overwhelming amount of data available to voters forces them 
to seek out information which reinforces already-held positions. If true, this 
would imply that campaign targeting on the Internet is ineffective as the 
users will only seek out candidates with whom they already agree.  
 Due to the increasing importance of the Internet as a campaign plat-
form, its effectiveness in winning over new voters remains crucial. One of the 
more recent studies in the field has aimed to answer questions concerning 
social networking sites and political behavior, offering both hope and caution 
for campaigns’ use of these platforms. The study took place during the 2012 
presidential election and included a large amount of social media content 
from both parties. This study found that engaging in political activities on 
social networking sites had a positive relation to offline political involvement. 
However, the same study also found that only the social networking site 
Facebook saw a positive relationship between use and increased political in-
terest (Zhang, Seltzer, Bichard 2013).  
 This same study also researched the extent to which social networking 
sites encouraged selective exposure and avoidance of political information. 
Facebook and Twitter were found to have a positive relationship with users 
selectively seeking out information aligning with previously-held beliefs. This 
would imply that campaigns’ social media presence is being primarily ac-
cessed by those already likely to vote for a candidate. The study did, however, 
find no positive relationship between the use of a social networking site and 
the selective avoidance of information contradicting one’s political beliefs. 
This is slightly encouraging for campaigns, as it means that while undecided 
voters are unlikely to seek out a candidate’s social media presence, they will 
also not attempt to avoid anything that may happen to be presented to them 
(Zhang, Seltzer, Bichard 2013). Finally, this study found that only YouTube 
usage had a positive relationship with strong party affiliation (Zhang, 
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Seltzer, Bichard 2013). The reasons for this connection are not examined and 
I was unable to find other studies explaining this link.  
 Researchers have found that campaigns’ use of social networking sites 
do not have a significant influence on persuading voters to change their 
minds about certain issues. One study found that less than half of all users 
follow officials who hold viewpoints opposing their own, leading to a lack of 
access to opposing ideas. Additionally, that study suggested that users con-
fronted with information opposing their viewpoints are likely to seek out data 
that rebuts the claim and are uninterested in fully considering or adopting 
that information. This finding undermines campaigns’ recent forays into us-
ing social networking sites and online presence to find persuadable voters 
(Johnson, Zhang, Bichard 2011).  
Analysis and Predictions 
The 2012 presidential campaigns featured a variety of microtargeting tactics 
first established during the 2004 election, but also introduced new trends into 
the election process. While some of these tactics failed to garner the desired 
response, others have the ability to further influence the ways  in which cam-
paigns interact with the American electorate. Voter turnout operations and 
online campaigning fall into the latter category. 
 The move towards campaigning on social media sites began during the 
2008 Democratic primaries. Since then, campaigns have continued to encour-
age further online activity and outreach, using it to campaign and organize 
volunteers for events. Campaigns have pointed to the decrease in American 
television consumption as a reason to eliminate some television advertising 
in favor of online messaging. By some estimates, a third of potential viewers 
of political television commercials in 2008 would not see any in 2012, demon-
strating the increasing substitution of the Internet for television (Peters 
2012). Thus, it would appear that turning to online messaging would allow 
campaigns to fully access those voters who have left the television-watching 
demographic. 
 Unfortunately for political campaigns, the studies cited in this work 
have demonstrated many of challenges facing advertising efforts on social 
media and the Internet in general. Internet advertisements suffer from low 
rates of interaction, with between 1 in 500 and 1 in 1,000 online advertise-
ments being clicked on by a user (Rampell 2014). Additionally, users of social 
networking sites have been found to selectively avoid following online profiles 
of elected officials with differing viewpoints, preventing campaigns from 
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reaching most of the voters who are not already supportive of the candidate 
(Johnson, Zhang, Bichard 2011). These findings indicate that online cam-
paign advertising is reaching far fewer individuals than previous television 
ads in the past and that campaigns’ advertising on social networking sites 
should encourage get-out-the-vote efforts from likely voters, not persuading 
wedge-issue voters. 
 Online messaging is almost exclusively effective only if the recipient al-
ready supports the candidate and no positive connection has been found be-
tween the use of social networking sites and political interest, nor party affil-
iation. (Zhang, Seltzer, Bichard 2013). Since 2004, campaigns have used mi-
crotargeting to find likely supporters and wedge-issue voters, but the data on 
online messaging suggests this trend will soon fade. As campaigns escalate 
their use of Internet contact and social networking sites, their work will focus 
on identifying likely supporters and shifting away from the intense focus on 
wedge-issue voters. (Peters 2012).  
 Increased targeting of likely supporters indicates a shift toward cam-
paigns that will aim to mobilize their base in any given election. When the 
2004 and 2008 campaigns targeted both likely supporters and wedge-issue 
voters, voter turnout during the presidential elections increased over the pre-
vious cycle. In 2012, with the increased emphasis on online messaging, voter 
turnout fell, marking the first presidential election drop-off in voter turnout 
in three cycles (McDonald 2013). While this change in messaging can hardly 
account for the entirety of that drop, the implications of this shift suggest it is 
a contributing factor to some degree.    
 Another trend worth noting is the use of voter turnout programs on 
Election Day. Despite Project Houdini’s failure in 2008, both Romney and 
Obama crafted new systems focused on voter tracking during the 2012 race. 
This suggests that political campaign operatives do not see voter turnout 
tracking as an ephemeral trend, but as a crucial part of future electoral 
strategy. Early voting has become more popular in recent elections, facilitat-
ing larger turnout among minority voters. Efforts by Republican lawmakers 
in states such as Ohio to limit this early voting have drawn accusations of 
voter suppression, claiming that the laws are intended to keep Democrats 
from capitalizing on their advantage with minority groups. Despite these at-
tempts to limit early voting, it appears campaigns are still preparing for con-
tinued expansion of early voting programs, as indicated by continued devel-
opment of voter tracking systems (Prince 2014). As the voting period is ex-
tended, campaigns will require a running estimate of how many votes a can-
 17
BUTLER JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, VOLUME 1
didate has received at any given time to increase the efficiency of voter con-
tact.  
 Finally, the increase in the amount of personal data available to cam-
paigns is likely to continue unabated as voters increase their online activity. 
Sites of all kinds have begun to notice the profitability of collecting and sell-
ing user data to campaigns and marketing firms, even if their content seems 
unrelated to politics. The online music site Pandora recently announced that 
it would begin tracking which music was being listened to in a certain area 
and compare that data to the area’s electoral turnout. The site hopes to de-
termine which musical artists and styles indicate a Republican or Democratic 
leanings. The site would be able to sell this information to campaigns and po-
litical organizations to be used in online microtargeting efforts (Dwoskin 
2014).  
 This trend in the availability of personal information shows no signs of 
slowing down. National parties will surely continue to pass along existing 
voter profiles to their presidential candidates so campaigns don’t have to 
start from scratch. Despite the increase in available data, studies suggest 
that campaigns are targeting fewer voters on fewer issues. Microtargeting, 
despite being credited with several major electoral wins, seems to have 
turned the corner on its ability to target the right kinds of voters voters as 
campaigns move online. The possibility that American presidential cam-
paigns have reached a point where their tactics are limiting the size and ideo-
logical diversity of the electorate is alarming, especially when voters’ person-
al data is more accessible than ever. While the decline in voter turnout in 
2012 was due to a host of factors, my findings suggest that campaign tactics 
played a role. A vibrant democracy requires that citizens remain highly in-
formed and that they voice their opinions through voting. If the trends sug-
gested by this research continue, campaigns’ tactics will be working against 
those very goals. Such tactics may work well in achieving electoral victory, 
but will ultimately lead to the undermining of American democracy.  
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